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“LAWYERS” NOT “LIARS”: A MODIFIED TRADITIONALIST 
APPROACH TO TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS 
LONNIE T. BROWN, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 1998, I met a gentleman named Delroy Sheriffe.  
My wife and I were vacationing in Jamaica, and Delroy was the head bartender 
at the hotel where we were staying.  Over the course of our weeklong visit, we 
got to know Delroy quite well, and he shared numerous entertaining tales with 
us.  His most memorable comment, however, was uttered in response to my 
telling him that I was a lawyer.  In a heavy Jamaican accent, Delroy mockingly 
proclaimed: “Ah, a lawyer!  I tell you the truth and you tell lies for me.”  
Although this statement was surely made in jest, it was apparent to me that 
Delroy really believed that his characterization of an attorney’s role was 
accurate. 
The timing of my encounter with Delroy was particularly fortuitous 
because it closely preceded my first semester teaching professional 
responsibility.  His words served as a reminder to me of what I have come to 
recognize as the widely held, negative perception of lawyers by the public.1  
Clients can confidentially tell us their deepest, darkest, nastiest secrets, and it is 
our job to do everything in our power to obtain the outcome that they desire, 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  J.D., Vanderbilt Law 
School, 1989; B.A., Emory University, 1986.  I would like to thank my legal ethics colleague and 
mentor Professor C. Ronald Ellington for his perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this 
article.  In addition, I would like to express special thanks to my wife Kim, who has assisted and 
inspired my development as a teacher more than anyone else. 
 1. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 4 (2000) (observing that “[o]nly a fifth of those surveyed by the American Bar 
Association (ABA) felt that lawyers could be described as ‘honest and ethical’”); Harry T. 
Edwards, A Lawyer’s Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1149 (1990) 
(“Lawyers certainly deserve all the criticism they can get. . . . Those are universally held feelings 
by everyone who has ever dealt with the legal establishment.”) (quoting Marlin Fitzwater, Press 
Secretary to President George H. W. Bush); Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The 
“Z” Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 549, 561 (2002) (observing that it is well documented that “a disturbingly high percentage of 
the American public has lost confidence in lawyers”). 
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including lie.2  The fact that Delroy and other non-lawyers consider this to be 
the true nature of my chosen calling troubled me, but not so much as my 
recognition that many within the profession itself cling to a similar 
misconception.3 
 
 2. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that one of the most negative traits that the public 
associates with lawyers is a “willingness to manipulate the system on behalf of clients without 
regard to right or wrong”); see also ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF 
LAWYERS: CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 7–8 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf (indicating that survey results suggest, among other 
things, “that lawyers have a reputation for winning at all costs” and “are believed to manipulate 
both the system and the truth”); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., “May It Please the Camera, . . . I Mean the 
Court”—An Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 134 (2004) 
(observing that the practice of attorneys making groundless statements to the media on behalf of 
clients may result in lawyers being “viewed as unscrupulous mouthpieces who will say almost 
anything to advocate their positions before the court of public opinion”); Kevin Cole & Fred C. 
Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1667 
(1996) (suggesting that “the more the public feels (correctly or incorrectly) that attorneys speak 
dishonestly on behalf of their clients, the less we can expect the public . . . to trust lawyers’ 
assertions”). 
  Although the ethics rules do not expressly use the pejorative term “lie,” various 
provisions clearly indicate that lying, in the fundamental sense, is prohibited.  See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); id. at R. 3.3(a)(1) (“A 
lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a 
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer . . . .”); id. at 
R. 3.3(a)(3) (prohibiting lawyers from in any way participating in the knowing presentation of 
false evidence to the court and requiring the initiation of reasonable remedial measures in the 
event that the lawyer discovers the falsity after the evidence has been offered); id. at R. 3.4(b) (“A 
lawyer shall not . . . falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an 
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law . . . .”); id. at R. 4.1 (“In the course of 
representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or 
law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”); id. 
at R. 7.1 (“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer’s services.”); id. at R. 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”).  It should be noted, 
however, that “immaterial” lies are apparently not proscribed by the ethics rules.  See, e.g., id. at 
R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (observing that “[u]nder generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types 
of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact,” such as, “[e]stimates of 
price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable 
settlement of a claim . . . .”). 
  All references to the “ethics rules” throughout this Article will be to the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which is the principal rule set that I rely 
upon in teaching professional responsibility. 
 3. See, e.g., RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE 
AMERICAN LAWYER 3 (1999) (noting that “[w]hile the public looks to the legal system for the 
truth, lawyers often look to spin the truth from their clients’ perspectives”); Harris, supra note 1, 
at 551 (noting Georgia Supreme Court Justice Hardy Gregory’s observation in modern law 
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My personal experience in private practice revealed to me that more than a 
few members of the bar regard it as proper to abuse, berate, demean and 
intimidate opposing counsel, so long as they have their clients’ wishes and best 
interests at heart.4  Indeed, such legal warriors claim that it is their “ethical” 
duty to pull out all the stops, no matter what the costs.5  According to them, if 
 
practice of “a new meanness and blind insistence on the rights of clients with a serious lack of a 
spirit of compromise and sometimes even common sense”); Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin 
Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1849 
(1995) (noting Floyd Abrams’s argument that “lawyers are justified in lying to the press about 
their clients” given the nature of the adversary process). 
 4. The concept of neutral partisanship or nonaccountability is resorted to in justification of 
such behavior, as it removes all elements of social responsibility from the lawyer’s role.  See 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 78 (3d ed. 2004) 
(noting Professor Murray Schwartz’s principle of nonaccountability as providing that “[w]hen 
acting as an advocate for a client . . . , a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally 
accountable for the means used or the ends achieved”); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND 
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 52 (1988). 
 5. The classic formulation of this client-centered, hyper-zealous posture is Lord Henry 
Brougham’s famous quote regarding his representation in Queen Caroline’s Case: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and 
that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only 
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others.  Separating the duty of a patriot from that of 
an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy 
fate to involve his country in confusion. 
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 71–72; see also Harris, supra note 1, at 569–70 (“Zealous 
advocacy is the doctrine which excuses, without apology, outrageous and unconscionable conduct 
so long as it is done ostensibly for a client, and, of course, for a price.”) (quoting from an order 
authored by Illinois Circuit Judge Richard Curry). 
  Of course, there are defined ethical limits for lawyers, as well as express prohibitions 
with regard to the very conduct in which certain zealous advocates feel legally compelled to 
engage.  Specifically, Model Rule 3.4 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or 
conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.  A lawyer shall 
not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; 
. . . 
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably 
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; 
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or 
that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in 
issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a 
cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or 
innocence of an accused . . . . 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2007); see also id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (indicating that a 
“lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or 
preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect”). 
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an unfair advantage can be obtained in litigation or negotiation, they have no 
choice but to pursue and exploit it, particularly if that is what the client 
desires.6 
I teach professional responsibility, in large measure, because I am deeply 
disturbed by the ubiquitous lay perception expressed by Delroy and even more 
appalled by the zealous excesses of counsel that provide evidentiary support 
for this tainted impression.  My fear is that cadres of young lawyers will 
mistakenly identify with this flawed image and will misperceive that it is their 
legal duty to push the ethical envelope to its limits and beyond whenever 
necessary for the so-called “good” of the client.  My mission as a teacher of 
legal ethics is to counteract this negative conceptualization of lawyers by 
emphasizing the nobleness of our profession, as best demonstrated by the 
enormously unique power and opportunity that we possess to serve and protect 
the public welfare, in pursuing our private clients’ interests7 and otherwise.8 
As attorneys, we undeniably should be faithful confidantes to, and staunch 
allies for, our clients,9 but we must also never lose sight of the fact that we are 
not simply client representatives; we are concurrently officers of the court and 
 
  Furthermore, Model Rule 2.1 makes it very clear that a lawyer’s role in serving a client 
includes an obligation to provide wise and candid counsel, even if that is not what the client 
seemingly wishes to hear.  See id. at R. 2.1.  In particular, Rule 2.1 indicates that “[i]n 
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render 
candid advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations 
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s 
situation.”  Id.  Moreover, the comments to the rule provide that “[i]t is proper for a lawyer to 
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice.”  Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 2. 
 6. But see id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (noting that although a lawyer should zealously represent the 
interest of a client, he or she “is not bound . . . to press for every advantage that might be 
realized”); id. at R. 4.4(b) cmt. 3 (providing that “[a] lawyer who receives a document relating to 
the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document 
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender” and may return the document voluntarily 
to the sender in the exercise of his or her professional judgment). 
 7. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Renewing Our Commitment to the Highest Ideals of the 
Legal Profession, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (2006) (acknowledging Justice Louis Brandeis’s 
argument that “a lawyer must both participate in the political process and aim to influence private 
clients to view their interests in ways that are consistent with the public good”); see also infra 
note 10. 
 8. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007) (noting that “[a] 
lawyer must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in 
advocacy upon the client’s behalf”); id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (indicating that “[a] fundamental 
principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, 
the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation”); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (stating 
that “[l]oyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a 
client”). 
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keepers of the public trust.10  Though I strive diligently to make my students 
aware of the specific ethical duties owed to clients, I always stress even more 
intently the importance of these latter two components of their professional 
obligation.  They are what set the practice of law apart from other occupations, 
and they are what should serve to inspire us to conduct ourselves in a manner 
befitting this grand calling.11 
The problem, of course, is how does one go about teaching this beyond 
merely stating it as a lofty truism?  Sophisticated law students will quickly be 
turned off by Pollyanna-toned lectures about some seemingly unachievable 
legal Utopia.  As a result, I think that many legal ethics professors deploy 
innovative teaching techniques in an effort to place the subject matter in a 
context that can be taken seriously and perceived as real by students.  For me, 
the most effective pedagogical approach for attaining these objectives has been 
to teach professional responsibility in a manner comparable to most 
mainstream substantive law school courses, with a few calculated deviations. 
I endeavor to convey the critical nuts and bolts of the subject (the rules and 
the law) to students by way of the familiar case method, combined with 
Socratic dialogue.  Though this is anything but pioneering, I suspect that I am 
 
 10. See id. at pmbl. ¶ 1 (noting that besides being a representative of his or her clients, a 
lawyer is also “an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for 
the quality of justice”); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of 
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162 (1958) (observing that “partisan advocacy is a 
form of public service so long as it aids the process of adjudication; it ceases to be when it 
hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts and obfuscates, when it renders the task of the 
deciding tribunal not easier, but more difficult”); Anthony T. Kronman, The Law as a Profession, 
in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 29, 32 
(Deborah L. Rhode ed. 2000) (emphasizing that “[a] lawyer who is doing his job well dwells in 
the tension between private interest and public good, and never overcomes it.  He struggles 
constantly between the duty to serve his client and the equally powerful obligation to serve the 
good of the law as a whole.”); see also Robert F. Drinan, New Horizons in the Role of Law 
Schools in Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 347, 348 (1995) (maintaining 
that “[o]ne of the deepest moral convictions of the American legal profession has been that 
lawyers, as officers of the court, have a duty to make certain that the administration of justice 
serves everyone, including the poor”); Edwards, supra note 7, at 1427 (observing that “great 
lawyers seek to serve their clients and the public good, and these commitments are not seen as 
mutually exclusive”). 
 11. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 1151 (noting Professor Roger Cramton’s observation that 
“[i]ncreasingly, many lawyers have lost a sense of obligation to courts, opponents, and the 
general public”); Edwards, supra note 7, at 1423 (suggesting that by virtue of our training, “the 
public has a right to assume that lawyers have attained a certain level of technical competence, 
share a commitment to a defined set of ethical norms, and accept the responsibility to interpret 
and practice the law in public-regarding ways”); see also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 
(2006) (stating “[t]he practice of law is a public trust [and] [l]awyers are trustees of the system”); 
Fuller & Randall, supra note 10, at 1159 (observing that “[a] profession to be worthy of the name 
must inculcate in its members a strong sense of the special obligations that attach to their 
calling”). 
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likely among a minority of legal ethics professors who make extensive use of 
this teaching style.  Part I of this Article explains the reasons for my choice, 
certain aspects of my specific case method, and the perceived benefits that 
flow from this manner of instruction. 
While I fully believe that my traditional law school modus operandi is an 
efficient and effective way for me to communicate the substance of 
professional responsibility, the calculated deviations that I employ are what I 
consider most essential in enabling me to reach my students and memorably 
impress upon them the difficulties and virtues of being a lawyer.  Part II 
reveals and elaborates upon the special nuances that I inject into the course as a 
change of pace and a complement to my rather straightforward study of ethics 
rules and cases. 
Even more fundamentally, however, the goal of debunking the “Delroy 
myth” inevitably occupies the forefront of my mind when teaching 
professional responsibility; it informs my approach at all times and inspires my 
enthusiasm for the subject.  “Lawyers” and “liars” may sound alike, but it is 
my hope that no one who encounters my former students will ever confuse the 
two. 
I.  THE CASE METHOD AS A TOOL FOR PROVIDING CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE 
One of the most common refrains that I receive from former students 
relates to how much more sense law school courses make to them once they 
become actively engaged in the practice of law.  This reality is something with 
which all professors must contend.  Within the confines of the classroom, how 
does one go about putting a law school course into a context that will cause 
students to appreciate and understand both the significance and relevance of 
the material to practicing law? 
I think the short answer is we cannot, at least not fully.  As with any 
endeavor, it is simply impossible to grasp completely what the law is really 
about without actual experience.  My wife and I attended parenting classes and 
read various books to prepare for the arrival of our first daughter, but little of 
the information made sense until we ultimately became parents—in truth, some 
of it ended up making no sense whatsoever, but we would not have known any 
better absent being immersed in the actual parenthood enterprise. 
Practice and experience truly are the best teachers, but few professors have 
the luxury of being able to place their students in authentic legal settings as 
part of their pedagogy.  We have to figure out a meaningful alternative.  For 
me, at least as a starting point and frame of reference, actual cases are the 
optimal tool.  There are several reasons for this. 
First, it is important for students to take the subject matter very seriously.  I 
do not want them to view their required course in legal ethics as merely some 
tedious rite of passage.  Students need to view professional responsibility in the 
same manner that they look upon constitutional law or civil procedure.  Indeed, 
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I hope to impress upon them that professional responsibility is actually even 
more important because it concerns the law that governs lawyers specifically.  
It is the only course that focuses upon the legal rules of the profession; and 
what could possibly be more significant for an aspiring attorney?  In any event, 
using the case method, at a minimum, causes students to equate legal ethics 
with their other substantive courses. 
In addition, the use of cases resembles a narrative story, adding an element 
of reality to the content, causes, and effects of ethical lapses by counsel.  While 
hypothetical problems are definitely useful, they can, at times, come across as 
unrealistic academic exercises, which may lead students to dismiss them as 
impractical, even when based on real life scenarios.  The familiarity and 
genuineness of reported decisions, however, prevent them from being so easily 
disregarded. 
I must concede, though, that even with cases, students have a tendency to 
view the offending lawyers as aberrational wrongdoers, and therefore, they 
find it difficult to relate the dilemma presented to themselves.  In an effort to 
remedy this inclination, I frequently call upon a student to place himself or 
herself in the precise situation of the lawyer involved.  Almost inevitably, the 
chosen student will initially proclaim a propensity to act differently under 
similar circumstances.  Further questioning and probing, however, typically 
leads to greater understanding of the realities of the offending lawyer’s 
situation and recognition of how difficult it probably was for him or her to 
avoid the ethical transgression in question.  The best example of this is the 
young lawyer who fails to expose the professional misconduct of a supervisory 
attorney.12  After discussing such a case, most students admit that they might 
very well have acted in exactly the same manner.  These honest concessions 
then almost always lead to a meaningful exchange concerning alternative 
strategies for dealing with such a perplexing ethical conundrum. 
I employ a similar technique with regard to coverage of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Whenever we cover a case, I invariably spend a 
significant amount of time parsing through the pertinent Model Rules, whether 
or not they were actually discussed in the decision.13  Often, a superficial 
reading will suggest a straightforward resolution of the dilemma involved.  
 
 12. One of the classic vehicles for discussing this topic is the tragic case of Joseph 
Fortenberry, a talented associate at the New York law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton & 
Irvine, whose career was derailed by his decision to remain silent after witnessing a senior partner 
falsely claim to the court and opposing counsel that relevant documents had been destroyed.  See 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1101–05 (4th ed. 
2005). 
 13. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Seeing the Trees Within the Forest: Contextualized Ethics 
Courses as a Strategy for Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 230 (1995) 
(noting that “[a] central goal of any ethics course must be to learn to read the rules rigorously and 
critically”). 
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Careful dissection, however, uncovers subtle ambiguities that frequently add 
surprisingly confounding levels of complexity.  Model Rule 1.13 is my favorite 
example of this phenomenon. 
On the surface, Rule 1.13 appears to be a very powerful and demanding 
rule for lawyers representing organizational clients, but closer examination can 
lead one to conclude that the Rule, in actuality, can be interpreted to require 
very little, if anything, from a lawyer faced with perceived organizational 
wrongdoing.14  This then allows me to engage the students in a dialogue about 
what attorneys in such situations should do, which in turn leads to a broader 
discussion concerning the concept of professional responsibility.  Specifically, 
in many instances, the ethical rules ultimately leave lawyers with the task of 
exercising their discretion to decide upon the appropriate course of action 
 
 14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007).  The pertinent portion of Model 
Rule 1.13 provides as follows: 
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting 
through its duly authorized constituents. 
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person 
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a 
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the 
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, 
and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall 
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the 
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization 
to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf 
of the organization as determined by applicable law. 
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if 
(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority 
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely 
and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, 
and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, 
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 
1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization. 
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer’s 
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend 
the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the 
organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. 
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the 
lawyer’s actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under 
circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those 
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the 
organization’s highest authority is informed of the lawyer’s discharge or withdrawal. 
Id. 
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when faced with an ethical quandary.15  The process of addressing these types 
of questions in practice is truly the essence of professional responsibility.  How 
we choose to act in such circumstances defines both who we are individually 
and collectively as a profession. 
I could recount further instances of the educational benefits of the case 
method in teaching professional responsibility, but suffice it to say that when 
combined with exacting coverage of the rules, this approach provides an 
effective and efficient way for me to contextualize legal ethics and to create a 
sense of relevance for students.  Admittedly, though, if used in isolation, this 
instructional formula is a woefully inadequate mechanism for getting students 
excited and inspired about the subject matter and the legal profession in 
general.  For this reason, I incorporate a few modifications to my otherwise 
conventional style. 
II.  CALCULATED DEVIATIONS THAT ENHANCE CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE 
In an effort to excite and inspire my students, I complement my 
traditionalist approach with certain calculated deviations that accentuate my 
ability to accomplish the overall objectives of the course.  First, and perhaps 
foremost, I try to make the class entertaining. 
One of the most well-received attempts at entertainment is my use of 
movie clips to supplement our coverage of several topics.  The two most 
effective clips that I show are from A Time to Kill16 and The Rainmaker.17  I 
utilize A Time to Kill in connection with my treatment of the attorney-client 
privilege and the duty of confidentiality.  The specific scene upon which I 
concentrate is an exchange that takes place between Carl Lee Hailey (Samuel 
L. Jackson), the protagonist father whose young daughter has been brutally 
raped, and Jake Brigance (Matthew McConaughey), a local criminal defense 
lawyer.18  Their discussion occurs in Jake’s office following the apprehension 
 
 15. See id. at pmbl. ¶ 9 (indicating that “[w]ithin the framework of [the Rules of Professional 
Conduct] . . . many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise.  Such issues must be 
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules”). 
 16. A TIME TO KILL (Warner Bros. 1996). 
 17. THE RAINMAKER (Paramount Pictures 1997).  I also use clips from THE VERDICT 
(Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1982) and ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 
Corp. 1959) when discussing the topics of client perjury and witness coaching. 
 18. See A TIME TO KILL, supra note 16.  Given the violent nature of the subject matter of the 
movie and the offensive language that is utilized, I am always very careful to warn my students 
ahead of time.  Students who are uncomfortable viewing the clip, privately communicate this fact 
to me and are excused from that class session.  After class I meet with them to discuss the 
scenario so that they can follow and participate in future discussions concerning it. 
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of the two men suspected of committing the rape.19  Here is the critical 
substance of the conversation: 
Carl Lee: You remember them four white boys raped that little black girl in the 
Delta? 
Jake: Yeah. 
Carl Lee: They got off, didn’t they? 
Jake: Yeah. 
Carl Lee: If I was in a jam, you’d help me out, wouldn’t you Jake? 
Jake: Sure Carl Lee.  What kind of jam you talkin’ about? 
Carl Lee: You got a daughter Jake; . . . what would you do?20 
When Jake arrives home from work that evening, he conveys the details of this 
exchange to his wife, and it is apparent that Jake suspects Carl Lee might do 
something violent to the accused men.21  On the following day, Carl Lee, in 
fact, guns down the two defendants while they are en route to their 
arraignment, and he is subsequently arrested and charged with first degree 
murder.22 
The first rather obvious question that I raise with my students is whether 
the conversation between Jake and Carl Lee is protected by the attorney-client 
privilege, putting aside for the time-being the crime-fraud exception to this 
doctrine.  Students invariably struggle with this question because their gut tells 
them that the exchange should not be covered by the privilege, but they really 
want it to be protected because they like and sympathize with Carl Lee.  In 
subsequent classes, we refer back to this same scene in discussing waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege, the crime-fraud exception, and the duty of 
confidentiality. 
Use of the clip from A Time to Kill has a number of educational benefits.  
First, it grabs the students’ attention.  Second, it makes them think about the 
material in a dynamic and challenging fashion.  Third, it is highly memorable.  
I would venture to guess that almost every student who has taken my course 
cannot encounter an attorney-client privilege question without having at least a 
momentary flashback to our discussion of A Time to Kill, and I am positive that 
none of them can watch the movie again without focusing, perhaps 
obsessively, on the privilege issue. 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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With regard to The Rainmaker,23 I use several of its opening scenes as a 
backdrop for discussing unauthorized practice of law and solicitation.  The 
chosen scenes are much lighter in tone than the clip from A Time to Kill, and 
typically generate a good bit of laughter throughout the viewing.  Most of the 
examples of misconduct that are portrayed seem fairly egregious on the surface 
and are obvious to the students.  For example, Danny DeVito’s character, Deck 
Shifflet, is engaged in the active practice of law even though he has been 
unsuccessful in passing the bar despite numerous attempts—he humorously 
refers to himself as a “paralawyer.”24  More subtle, however, is the fact that 
Deck’s in-person solicitation of a hospitalized, incapacitated accident victim is 
actually not professional misconduct for the very reason that he is not an 
attorney.  Rather, the attorney for whom he works, Bruiser Stone (Mickey 
Rourke),25 is the one who should be held ethically responsible for Deck’s 
misbehavior.26  Other blatant and not so blatant lapses in professional 
responsibility pervade the scenes, and we typically have a lively and 
entertaining discussion about them. 
As with A Time to Kill, I consider The Rainmaker to be extremely valuable 
for the purpose of making the lesson memorable.  I also find that it serves as a 
good exam-simulation exercise because it requires students to spot and explain 
issues.  Perhaps, the most significant benefit, however, is the simple injection 
of some humor into the course.  The subject of legal ethics is extremely 
serious, but if the mood and tone of the classroom are not periodically 
lightened, I fear that the course may drift towards being perceived as 
sanctimonious drudgery.  And if that happens, students will definitely leave the 
class with the wrong perspective on their professional responsibility as 
lawyers. 
Another variation that I incorporate into my traditional approach is the 
utilization of a group assignment.  In the past, I have used two different 
subjects for this portion of the class: (1) the propriety of admitting (or not 
admitting) avowed white supremacist Matthew Hale to the bar;27 and (2) the 
 
 23. See THE RAINMAKER, supra note 17. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c)(1) (2007) (“[A] lawyer shall be 
responsible for conduct of [a nonlawyer] that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific 
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved . . . .”); id. at R. 8.4(a) (“It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another . . . .”). 
 27. Matthew Hale applied for admission to the Illinois State Bar in 1998, and his application 
was initially denied based largely on the white supremacist agenda that he intended to pursue 
with his law license.  See In re Hale, Committee on Character and Fitness for the Third Appellate 
District of the Supreme Court of Illinois (1998), reprinted in HAZARD ET AL., supra note 12, at 
1037–46.  This raised some obvious First Amendment concerns, but his case eventually became 
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propriety of the professional discipline imposed upon President Bill Clinton for 
his conduct in connection with the Paula Jones/Monica Lewinsky matter.28  I 
divide the class up into randomly selected groups and assign them the task of 
meeting (outside of class time) and reaching a consensus, if possible, with 
regard to the chosen subject.  Though these matters are addressed in the 
casebook that I use,29 I require the students to do additional research to better 
inform their group discussions.  Each group must elect a spokesperson to 
convey the sentiment of its members to the entire class, and that person is then 
subject to follow-up questions from me, as well as comments and critiques 
from other classmates. 
Although this can be a time-consuming endeavor, taking up the better part 
of two class sessions, I find that it is a very effective vehicle for discussing the 
process of admission and the structure and nature of the disciplinary system.  
Politics and racial attitudes inevitably come into play in our discourse, but 
fortunately rarely in a destructive manner.  Besides the substantive educational 
benefits that flow from the group discussions, this format also usually has the 
added effect of making students, thereafter, more comfortable about 
volunteering their thoughts and opinions to the class.  For this reason, I always 
employ this deviation towards the beginning of the course. 
There are several additional modifications to my traditionalist style that I 
make use of, but I will conclude by simply discussing the one that I feel is the 
most meaningful and important.  Lawyers, by virtue of their training and their 
role, occupy a very unique niche within society.  As the Preamble to the Model 
Rules states, a lawyer is “a public citizen having special responsibility for the 
 
much less controversial when Hale’s undisclosed arrest record came to light.  See Bob Van Voris, 
Muddying the Waters—Ill. Racist’s Free Speech Case is Complicated by His Arrest Record, 
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2000, at A1.  The nondisclosure itself would have provided an adequate 
basis for denying Hale admission, even apart from the arrests themselves.  See id.; see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2007) (providing that “[a]n applicant . . . to the 
bar . . . shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a 
fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the 
matter . . . .”).  In addition, Hale most likely forever doomed his admission efforts when he was 
convicted and sentenced to forty years in prison for soliciting the murder of a federal judge.  See 
Jodi Wilgoren, 40-Year Term for Supremacist in Plot on Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at 
A16. 
 28. President Clinton voluntarily accepted a five-year suspension from the Arkansas State 
Bar in 2001 for having provided false and misleading testimony during his deposition in the Paula 
Jones litigation.  See Talk Back Live: President Clinton Strikes a Deal with Independent Counsel 
(CNN television broadcast Jan. 19, 2001) (transcript available at http://edition.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0101/19/tl.00.html).  The disciplinary action arose out of Judge Susan Webber 
Wright’s contempt finding with regard to President Clinton and her subsequent referral of the 
matter to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Committee on Professional Conduct.  See Jones v. 
Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1135 (E.D. Ark. 1999). 
 29. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 12, at 1037–52, 1147–48. 
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quality of justice.”30  The Preamble later elaborates upon this point in the 
following manner: 
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the 
legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered 
by the legal profession. . . . A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the 
administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons 
who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all 
lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence 
to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of 
economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A 
lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should 
help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.31 
Model Rule 6.1 takes this notion a step farther by expressly codifying for 
lawyers the aspirational goal of fifty hours of voluntary pro bono service on 
behalf of or in relation to individuals who are unable to afford legal 
representation.32  The special ability that we possess to fulfill this commitment 
is central to what makes the practice of law such a noble undertaking.  If we 
fail to live up to this aspect of our calling, then the worth of our profession is, 
in my mind, diminished.  As a result, above all else, I want to educate my 
 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2007). 
 31. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 6. 
 32. See id. at R. 6.1.  Model Rule 6.1 provides: 
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to 
pay.  A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal 
services per year.  In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: 
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or 
expectation of fee to: 
(1) persons of limited means or 
(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational 
organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of 
limited means; and 
(b) provide any additional services through: 
(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, 
groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or 
public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational 
organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the 
payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization’s 
economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate; 
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited 
means; or 
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal 
profession. 
In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that 
provide legal services to persons of limited means. 
Id. 
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students about this most essential element of their professional responsibility 
as lawyers. 
Rather than lecture to them or regale them with heartwarming stories of 
personal experiences of attorneys who have volunteered their services, I have 
chosen to place them in precisely the same situation (almost) in which they 
will find themselves during practice.  On the first day of class, I inform them 
that I will give students modest extra credit for providing at least six hours of 
volunteer service to any organization or endeavor that is designed to help those 
who are less fortunate.33  I provide students with some helpful reference 
resources, but beyond that, it is up to them to ascertain an appropriate 
volunteer opportunity.  By a certain date, they are required to submit to me in 
writing a description of their proposed volunteer activity for my approval.  
Following the completion of their work, students must submit a written report 
to me that describes what they did, why they selected it, and most importantly, 
what they got out of it.  Here is a small sampling of the types of organizations 
and activities that students have chosen: (1) Habitat for Humanity, (2) Sexual 
Assault Center, (3) Boys & Girls Club, (4) Athens Justice Project (which 
provides pro bono legal representation, support, and guidance to criminal 
defendants who exhibit a sincere desire to change their lives), (5) Project Safe 
(which provides safe haven to female victims of domestic violence and their 
children), (6) elementary school tutoring, (7) working in soup kitchens, 
(8) volunteering at homeless shelters, and (9) visiting adult assisted living 
facilities. 
Typically, a large percentage of the class will successfully complete the 
assignment and receive some level of extra credit.  The vast majority have 
extraordinarily positive experiences, often communicated to me in genuinely 
heart-warming prose.  One of my favorites is from a student who chose to 
volunteer in a homeless shelter, and his reflections capture very nicely what I 
have found to be the general sentiment of those who undertake the extra credit 
project: 
  The experience was a reality check for [me].  Life in law school is very 
demanding and sometimes I, like other classmates, feel as if I’ll never make it 
through.  I have also found myself commiserating with others about our job 
searches and not getting the results [for which] we had hoped.  This 
experience, though, reminded me that no matter how hard my life in law 
school gets, or no matter how many rejection letters I might receive, there are 
many, many less fortunate people in the world.  This experience put all of my 
problems into perspective.  Things that I thought were the most important in 
my life took a back seat for this time.  After seeing what others go through on a 
 
 33. In light of unauthorized practice restrictions, students’ volunteer efforts need not be 
related directly to any sort of legal representation.  The critical requirement is that whatever they 
select must be geared towards helping the less fortunate in our community.  In addition, it should 
be noted that many of my students exceed the six-hour minimum volunteer requirement. 
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daily basis, just to survive, I was reminded just how fortunate I have been in 
life. 
  If there is one important lesson to take from this experience, it is that I 
should never take the things I have for granted.  I must appreciate what life 
gives me, but at the same time, I must give something back.  Taking time out 
of my life to help others in need really should not be the result of an extra 
credit assignment.  This is one experience that I will take from law school and 
not soon forget.34 
Not even the most adept instructor could effect such a profound and lasting 
impression upon a future member of our profession.  I view such an experience 
as the quintessential complement to the remainder of my teaching efforts.  It is 
the capstone that enables students to comprehend the true magnitude of their 
professional calling and hopefully whets their appetites with regard to the 
enormous good that they can accomplish within the legal system, as well as 
society at large.  This is the essence of a lawyer’s professional responsibility, 
and as a teacher, this is what I strive to convey by word, example, and 
experience, above all else. 
CONCLUSION 
In teaching professional responsibility, professors must select the approach 
that most appropriately suits them, their perspective, and their audience.  
Regardless of chosen pedagogy, however, we all share a common goal that 
unifies our mission.  Simply put, we must prepare our students to disarm 
unflattering perceptions of lawyers as ethically void by instilling in them a 
desire to always do what is right, along with a commitment to serve the public 
good,35 treat others with dignity and respect, and restore honor to this most 
noble profession.36  It is an uncomplicated premise with which few can 
reasonably disagree.  Nevertheless, comments such as those by Delroy vividly 
display that teachers of legal ethics have an extraordinarily challenging and 
complex task, but one that could not possibly be more worthwhile. 
 
 34. Student Pro Bono Extra Credit Report (on file with the author). 
 35. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 10, at 1216 (noting that “[p]opular misconceptions of 
the advocate’s function disappear when the lawyer pleads without a fee, and the true value of his 
service to society is immediately perceived”). 
 36. See Edwards, supra note 7, at 1429 (“[W]hen students graduate from law schools, they 
should have more than a good understanding of the ethical standards of the profession.  They 
should also have a clear sense of our highest ideals.”); see also Edwards, supra note 1, at 1161 
(observing that “if academicians abdicate their duty to communicate the profession’s traditional 
commitment to the public good, they deliver students by default to the forces supporting an 
unbridled corporatizing of the profession”). 
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